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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has developed a novel framework for
assessing and communicating uncertainty in the ﬁndings published in its periodic assess-
ment reports. But how should these uncertainty assessments inform decisions? We take
a formal decision-making perspective to investigate how scientiﬁc input formulated in
the IPCC’s novel framework might inform decisions in a principled way through a nor-
mative decision model.1. Introduction. Assessment reports produced by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) periodically summarize the present state
of knowledge about climate change, its impacts, and the prospects for mit-
igation and adaptation. More than 800 lead authors and review editors (and
an even greater number of subsidiary authors and reviewers) contributed to
the ﬁfth and most recent report, which comprises a tome from each of three
working groups, plus the condensed technical summaries, approachable
summaries for policy makers, and a synthesis report. There is no new re-
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CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS 501ing research and report on the state of scientiﬁc knowledge. It is an unusually
generous allotment of scientiﬁc resources to summary, review, and commu-
nication, reﬂecting the pressing need for authoritative scientiﬁc ﬁndings to
inform policy making in an atmosphere of skepticism and powerful status
quo interests.
Scientiﬁc knowledge comes in degrees of uncertainty, and the IPCC has
developed an innovative approach to characterizing and communicating this
uncertainty.1 Its primary tools are probability intervals and a qualitative notion
of conﬁdence. In the reports’most carefully framed ﬁndings, the two metrics
are used together, with conﬁdence assessments qualifying statements of prob-
ability. The question we examine here is how such ﬁndings might be incorpo-
rated into a normative decision framework.While the IPCC’s treatment of un-
certainties has been discussed extensively in the scientiﬁc literature and in a
major external review (Shapiro et al. 2010), our question has not yet been ad-
dressed.
By exploring how scientiﬁc input in this novel formatmight systematically
inform rational decisions, we hope ultimately to improve climate change
decision making and to make IPCC ﬁndings more useful to consumers of
the reports. As will emerge below, the immediate lessons of this article con-
cern how the decision-theoretic perspective can help shape the IPCC’s uncer-
tainty framework itself and how that framework is used by IPCC authors. One
broader theoretical aim is to learn from the IPCC’s experiencewith uncertainty
assessment to improve evidence-based policy making more generally.
We begin by explaining the IPCC’s approach to uncertainty in greater de-
tail. We then survey recent work in decision theory that makes room for
second-order uncertainty of the kind conveyed by IPCC conﬁdence assess-
ments when those assessments qualify probabilities. We identify a family
of decision models (Hill 2013) as particularly promising for our purposes,
given IPCC practice and general features of the policy decision context.
We show how to map IPCC-style ﬁndings onto these models, and on the
basis of the resulting picture of how such ﬁndings inform decisions, we
draw some lessons about the way the IPCC uncertainty framework is cur-
rently being used.
2. Uncertainty in IPCC Reports. The ﬁfth and most recent assessment
report (AR5) afﬁrms unequivocally that the earth’s climate system is warm-
ing and leaves little room for doubt that human activities are largely to
blame. Yet climate change researchers continue to wrestle with deep and per-
sistent uncertainties regarding many of the speciﬁcs, such as the pace of
change in coming decades, the extent and distribution of impacts, or the1. Unless speciﬁed, we use “uncertainty” in the everyday sense rather than in the tech-
nical sense popular in economics, for instance.
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All uprospect of passing potentially calamitous “tipping points.” Further research
can, to a degree, reduce some of this uncertainty, but meanwhile, it must be
characterized, conveyed, and acted on. Communication of uncertainty by
IPCC authors is informed by an evolving set of guidance notes that share
best practices and promote consistency across chapters and working groups
(Moss and Schneider 2000; Manning 2005; Mastrandrea et al. 2010). These
documents also anchor a growing, interdisciplinary literature devoted to the
treatment of uncertainties within IPCC reports (Yohe and Oppenheimer
2011; Adler and Hadorn 2014).
One conspicuous feature of IPCC practice is the use of conﬁdence assess-
ments to convey a qualitative judgment about the extent of the evidence that
backs up a given ﬁnding. Naturally, this varies from one ﬁnding to the next.
And it is, intuitively, important information for policy makers. The format
for expressing conﬁdence has changed subtly from one IPCC cycle to the
next, in part responding to critical review (Shapiro et al. 2010); likewise
for the de facto implementation within each working group (Mastrandrea
and Mach 2011). In AR5, conﬁdence assessments are plentiful across all
three working groups, from the exhaustive, unabridged reports through all
of the summary and synthesis. The current guidance offers ﬁve qualiﬁers
for expressing conﬁdence: very low, low, medium, high, and very high. To
pick the right one, an author team appraises two aspects of the evidence
(roughly): how much there is (considering quantity, quality, and variety) and
how well different sources of evidence agree. The more evidence, and the
more agreement, the more conﬁdence (Mastrandrea et al. 2010).
The second approved uncertainty metric is probability.2 And by far the
most commonmode of presenting probabilities in AR5 is to use words cho-
sen from a preset menu of calibrated language, where, for example, likely
has an ofﬁcial translation of “66%–100% chance,” virtually certainmeans
“99%–100% chance,” and more likely than not means “>50% chance.”
There are 10 phrases on the menu, each indicating a different probability
interval. (Precise probability density functions are also sanctioned where
there is sufﬁcient evidence, though authors rarely exercise this option; per-
centiles from cumulative density functions are somewhat more common.)
Different author teamsmake somewhat different choices as they adapt the
common framework to the particulars of their subject area. One way in
which authors have used the metrics is in combination: where the ﬁnding
that is qualiﬁed by a conﬁdence assessment is itself a probabilistic statement.
In this case conﬁdence is pushed into second position in a now two-stage
characterization of overall uncertainty:2. The IPCC uses the term “likelihood,” though one should not read into this the tech-
nical meaning from statistics. We will use the more neutral term “probability.”
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All In the Northern Hemisphere, 1983–2012 was likely the warmest 30-year
period of the last 1400 years (medium conﬁdence). (IPCC 2013, 3)
Multiple lines of evidence provide high conﬁdence that an [equilibrium cli-
mate sensitivity] value less than 17C is extremely unlikely. (Stocker et al.
2013, 84)Many, though not all, IPCC ﬁndings satisfy this format. Plenty of conﬁ-
dence assessments do something other than modify a probability claim, such
as when an author team expresses conﬁdence in an observational trend or
gives a blanket appraisal of projections from a given modeling approach.
All probabilities, however, should be read as conﬁdence qualiﬁed. The con-
ﬁdence level is not always written out explicitly, but the guidance note in-
structs that “a ﬁnding that includes a probabilistic measure of uncertainty
does not require explicit mention of the level of conﬁdence associated with
that ﬁnding if the level of conﬁdence is ‘high’ or ‘very high’” (Mastrandrea
et al. 2010, 3), meaning that readers should take unaccompanied probabili-
ties to enjoy high or very high conﬁdence. Findings reported in the form of
the quotations above will be our focus here.
3. Decision, Imprecision, and Conﬁdence. Like any assessment that re-
ﬂects a state of knowledge (or belief ), the judgments of the IPCC can play
two sorts of roles. On the one hand, they can represent the salient features
of the world and our uncertainty about them; on the other hand, they can in-
form behavior, or policy. Any representation of uncertainty can be evaluated
by its capacity to fulﬁll each of these roles. While the IPCC uncertainty
framework has been developed mainly with the former role in mind—and
we shall assume for the purposes of this article that it fares sufﬁciently well
on this front—the focus here is on the latter role. Are there existing norma-
tively reasonable accounts of decision making into which the IPCC repre-
sentation of uncertainty provides relevant input, and what are the conse-
quences of bringing the two together?
At ﬁrst pass, the IPCC’s uncertainty framework seems far removed from
models developed by decision theorists. The standard approach in decision
theory, often termed Bayesianism, prescribes maximization of expected util-
ity relative to the probabilities of the possible states of the world and the util-
ities of the possible consequences of available actions. Naturally, in order
to apply this theory, the decision maker must be equipped with all decision-
relevant probabilities. (Utilities are also required, but as they reﬂect judgments
of value or desirability, they should come not from scientiﬁc reports but from
society or the policymaker.)What the IPCCdelivers, however, are not precise
probabilities but probability ranges, qualiﬁed by conﬁdence judgments. The
former are too imprecise to be used in the standard expected utility model;This content downloaded from 158.143.233.108 on July 06, 2017 03:44:14 AM
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All uthe latter have no role at all to play in that model. IPCC ﬁndings thus sit un-
comfortably with standard decision theory.
Thismismatch need not reﬂect badly on the IPCC framework. On the con-
trary, several researchers (Bradley 2009; Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler
2009, 2012; Joyce 2010; Gilboa and Marinacci 2013) have suggested that
the standard insistence on a single precise probability function leads to an
inadequate representation of uncertainty and moreover may have unintuitive
and indeed normatively undesirable consequences for decision. This has
motivated the development, within both philosophy and economics, of alter-
native theories of rational decision making, on which we can draw in our at-
tempt to accommodate scientiﬁc ﬁndings expressed using the IPCC uncer-
tainty framework. This literature is large, and here we will consider only a
few prominent models in our search for one with the appropriate features.
And while at points some remarks on what constitutes reasonable decision
behavior may be in order, we will not attempt a thorough normative compar-
ison of models, instead referring the interested reader to the literature for dis-
cussion.
3.1. Imprecise Probability. The use of probability ranges by the IPCC
invokes what is sometimes known in the theoretical literature as imprecise
probability. Central to much of this literature is the use of sets of probability
functions to represent the epistemic state of an agent who cannot determine a
unique probability for all events of interest. Informally we can think of this
set as containing those probability functions that the decision maker regards
as permissible to adopt given the information she holds.
To motivate the idea, recall Popper’s paradox of ideal evidence (1974,
407–8), which contrasts two cases in which we are asked to provide a prob-
ability for a coin landing heads. In the ﬁrst, we know nothing about the coin;
in the second, we have already observed 1,000 tosses and seen that it lands
heads roughly half the time. Our epistemic state in the second case can rea-
sonably be represented by a precise probability of one-half for the outcome
of heads on the next toss. By contrast, the thought goes, the evidence avail-
able in the ﬁrst case can justify only a set of probabilities—perhaps, indeed,
the set of all possible probabilities. To adhere to a single number, even the
“neutral” probability of one-half, would require a leap of faith from the de-
cision maker, and it is hard to see why she should be forced to make this
leap. Pragmatic considerations too suggest allowing imprecise probabilities.
Given a choice of betting either in the ﬁrst case or in the second, it seems
natural that one might prefer betting in the second, but a Bayesian decision
maker cannot have such preferences.33. The incompatibility of these and other reasonable preferences with Bayesianism is at
the heart of the structurally similar Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961).
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er’s information, she must pick a single probability function to be used in all
decisions. This is often called her “subjective” probability, and particularly
in cases in which the available information (combined with the decision
maker’s expertise and personal judgment) provides little guidance, the “sub-
jective” element may be rather hefty indeed. This probability function deter-
mines, together with a utility function on consequences, an expected utility
for each action available to the decision maker, and the theory enjoins her to
choose the action with greatest expected utility.
Despite the severity of uncertainty faced in the climate domain, Bayesian
decision theory has its adherents. John Broome, for instance, argues that in
climate policy decision making, “The lack of ﬁrm probabilities is not a rea-
son to give up expected value theory. You might despair and adopt some
other way of copingwith uncertainty. . . . That would be amistake. Stickwith
expected value theory, since it is very well founded, and do your best with
probabilities and values” (Broome 2012, 129).
Paralleling the points made in the coin example above, critics of the Bayes-
ian view argue that the decision maker may be unable to supply the required
precise subjective probabilities and that any “ﬁlling in” of the gap between
probability ranges and precise probabilities may prove too arbitrary to be a
reasonable guide to decision. Policy makers may quite reasonably refuse to
base a policy decision on a ﬂimsy information base, especially when there
is a lot at stake.
Imprecise probabilists, on the other hand, face the problem of spelling out
how a decision maker with a set of probability functions should choose. Her
problem can be put in the following way. Each probability function in her set
determines, together with a utility function on consequences, an expected
utility for each available action; but except on rare occasions when one ac-
tion dominates all others in the sense that its expected utility is greatest rel-
ative to every admissible probability function, this does not provide a sufﬁ-
cient basis for choice. Were the decision maker to simply average the
expected utilities associated with each action, her decisions would then be
indistinguishable from those of a Bayesian. There are, however, other con-
siderations that she can bring to bear on the problem that will lead her to act
in a way that cannot be given a Bayesian rationalization. She may wish, for
instance, to act cautiously, by giving more weight to the “down-side” risks
(the possible negative consequences of an action) than the “up-side” chances
or by preferring actions with a narrower spread of (expected) outcomes.
A much-discussed decision rule encoding such caution is the maximin
expected utility rule (MMEU), which recommends picking the action with
the greatest minimum expected utility relative to the set of probabilities
that the decision maker is working with (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). To
state the rulemore formally, letC 5 fp1,… , pngbe a set of probability func-This content downloaded from 158.143.233.108 on July 06, 2017 03:44:14 AM
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All utions,4 and for any p ∈ C and action f, let EUp( f ) be the expected utility of f
computed from p. The rule then ascribes a value V to each action f in accor-
dance with:4. Fo
se subMMEU. V ( f ) 5 minp∈C½EUp( f ).MMEU is simple to use but arguably too cautious, paying no attention at
all to the full spread of possible expected utilities. This shortcoming is mit-
igated in some of the other rules for decision making that draw on imprecise
probabilities, such as maximizing a weighted average of the minimum and
maximum expected utility (often called the a-MEU rule) or that of the min-
imum and mean expected utility, where the averaging weights can be thought
of as reﬂecting either the decision makers’ pessimism or their degree of cau-
tion (see, e.g., Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci 2004; Binmore 2008).
A question that all such rules must address is how to specify the set C of
probabilities on which they are based. Where evidence is sparse, the Bayes-
ian insistence on a single probability function seems too extreme; but if C
contains all probabilities logically consistent with the evidence, then the de-
cision maker is likely to end up with very wide probability intervals, which
can in turn lead to overly cautious decision making. A natural thought is that
C should determine probability intervals only so broad as to ensure the de-
cision maker is conﬁdent that the “true” probabilities lie within them or that
they contain all reasonable values (see, e.g., Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1982).
Thedecisionmakermay, for instance,wish to discard some implausible prob-
ability functions even though they are not, strictly speaking, contradicted
by the evidence. Or if the sources of these probabilities are the opinions of
others, the decision makers need not consider every opinion consistent with
the evidence, but rather only those in which they have some conﬁdence. But
how conﬁdent need they be? We return to this question below after discuss-
ing the notion of conﬁdence in more detail.
3.2. Conﬁdence. The decision rules canvassed above can make use of
the probability ranges found in IPCC reports, but not the conﬁdence judg-
ments that qualify them. According to the authors of the IPCC guidance
notes, “A level of conﬁdence provides a qualitative synthesis of an author
team’s judgment about the validity of a ﬁnding; it integrates the evaluation
of evidence and agreement in onemetric” (Mastrandrea et al. 2011, 679). Let
us address these two contributors to IPCC conﬁdence in turn.
“Evaluation of evidence” depends on the amount, or weight, of the evi-
dence relevant to the judgment in question. Suppose, for instance, that a de-
cision maker is pressed to report a single number for the chance of heads onr simplicity we suppose a ﬁnite set, but it need not be so.
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CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS 507the next coin toss in each of the two cases described above, namely, where
she knows nothing about the coin and where she has already observed many
tosses. She may report one-half in both cases but is likely to have more con-
ﬁdence in that assessment in the case in which the judgment is based on
abundant evidence (the previously observed tosses). The reason is that a
larger body of evidence is likely to be reﬂected in a higher level of conﬁ-
dence in the judgments that are based on it.
The second contributor to conﬁdence is “agreement.” To tweak the coin
example, compare a situation in which a group of coin experts agrees that
the probability of heads on the next toss is one-half with a second case in
which the same group is evenly split between those that think the probabil-
ity is zero and those that think it is one. Here too, a decision maker pressed
to give a single number might say one-half in both cases, but it seems rea-
sonable to have more conﬁdence in the ﬁrst case than in the second. Hold-
ing the amount of evidence ﬁxed, greater agreement engenders greater con-
ﬁdence.
The two dimensions of IPCC conﬁdence connect to largely distinct liter-
atures. The evidence dimension connects with that on the weight of evidence
behind a probability judgment and how this weight can be included in rep-
resentations of uncertainty (Keynes 1921/1973). The agreement dimension
connects with the literature on expert testimony and aggregation of probabil-
ity functions (for a survey, see Genest and Zidek [1986]). Models employing
conﬁdence weights on different possible probabilities are to be found in both
literatures. In the ﬁrst, the probabilities are interpreted as different probabi-
listic hypotheses and the weights as measures of the agent’s conﬁdence in
them. In the second, the probabilities are interpreted as the experts’ judg-
ments and the weights as a measure of an agent’s conﬁdence in the experts.
So while weight of evidence and expert agreement are two distinct notions,
they can be represented similarly and play analogous roles in determining
judgments and guiding action. It is thus not unreasonable to proceed in
the manner suggested by the IPCC and place both under a single notion of
conﬁdence.
What role should these second-order conﬁdence weights play in decision
making? To the extent that different probability judgments support different
assessments of the expected beneﬁt or utility of an action, one would expect
the relative conﬁdence (or lack of it) that a decision maker might have in the
former will transfer to the latter. It is then reasonable, ceteris paribus, to favor
actions with high expected beneﬁt based on the probabilities in which one
has the most conﬁdence over actions whose case for being beneﬁcial de-
pends on probabilities in which one has less conﬁdence.
One way to do this is to use the conﬁdence weights over probability mea-
sures to weight the corresponding ﬁrst-order expected utilities, determining
what might be called the conﬁdence-weighted expected utility (CWEU) ofThis content downloaded from 158.143.233.108 on July 06, 2017 03:44:14 AM
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All uan action. Formally, let C 5 fp1,… , png be a set of probability functions
and {ai} the corresponding weights, normalized so that oiai 5 1. Then:se subCWEU. V ( f ) 5 oiai  EUpi( f ).Here the weights effectively induce a second-order probability over C,
and maximizing CWEU is equivalent to maximizing expected utility rela-
tive to the aggregated probability function obtained by averaging the ele-
ments of C using the second-order probabilities. But this seems unsatisfac-
tory from a pragmatic point of view as it would preclude a decision maker
displaying the sort of caution, or aversion to uncertainty, that we argued
could be motivated in contexts like the coin example. Given a choice of bet-
ting on either one coin or the other, an agent following CWEU cannot prefer
betting on the coin for which she has more evidence. But some degree of dis-
crimination between high- and low-conﬁdence situations does seem appro-
priate for important policy decisions.
Other decision models proposed in the economics literature allow for this
kind of discrimination. The “smooth ambiguity” model of Klibanoff, Mari-
nacci, and Mukerji (2005) is a close variant of CWEU; it too uses second-
order probability, but it allows for an aversion to wide spreads of expected
utilities by valuing an action f in terms of the expectation (with respect to
the second-order probability) of a transformation of the EUpi( f ) rather than
the expected utilities themselves. Formally (and ignoring technicalities due
to integration rather than summation), the rule works as follows:KMM. V ( f ) 5 oiai  f(EUpi( f )).The term f is a transformation of expected utilities capturing the decision
maker’s attitudes to uncertainty (the decision maker displays aversion to un-
certainty whenever f is concave).
Other suggestions in this literature use general real-valued functions
(rather than probabilities) at the second-order level and can be thought of
as reﬁnements of the MMEU model discussed in the previous section.
Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982), for instance, use the weights to determine
the set of probability functions C 5 fp1,… , png by admitting only those
that exceed some conﬁdence threshold; they then apply MMEU. Macche-
roni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) value each action as the minimum,
across the set of probability functionsC, of the sum of the action’s expected
utility given pi and the second-order weight given to pi; and Chateauneuf
and Faro (2009) take the minimum of CWEUs over probability functions
with second-order weight beyond a certain absolute threshold.
From the perspective of this article, all these proposals suffer from a fun-
damental limitation. Application of these rules requires a cardinal measureThis content downloaded from 158.143.233.108 on July 06, 2017 03:44:14 AM
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CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS 509of conﬁdence to serve as the weights on probability measures. That is, the
numbers matter; otherwise it would make no sense to multiply or add them
as is done by these rules. Whenever such conﬁdence numbers are available,
these models are applicable. The IPCC, however, commits to providing only
a qualitative, ordinal measure of conﬁdence: it can say whether there is more
conﬁdence or less, in one probability judgment compared to another, but not
how much more or less.5 So the aforementioned models of decision require
information of a nature different from what is furnished in IPCC reports.
IPCC practice is not unreasonable in this respect. Indeed if the decision
maker has trouble forming precise ﬁrst-order probabilities, why would he
have any less trouble forming precise second-order conﬁdence weights?
Such considerations plead in favor of a more parsimonious representation
of conﬁdence, in line with the ordinal ranking used by the IPCC. To connect
this to decision making, however, a model is required that can work with
ordinal conﬁdence assessments without requiring cardinality. We have
found only one such model in the literature, namely, that proposed by Hill
(2013), which we now present in some detail.
3.3. Hill’s Decision Model. Hill’s central insight is that the probability
judgments we adopt can reasonably vary with what is at stake in a decision.
Consider, for instance, the schema for decision problems represented by ta-
ble 1, in which the option Act has a low probability of a very bad outcome
(utility x ≪ 0) and a high probability of a good outcome (utility y > 0). The
table could represent a high-stakes decision, such as whether to build a nu-
clear plant near a town when there is a small, imprecise probability of an ac-
cident with catastrophic consequences. But it could equally well represent a
low-stakes situation in which the agent is deciding whether to get on the bus
without a ticket when there is a small imprecise probability of being caught.
Standard decision rules, such as expected utility maximization or maxi-
min EU, are invariant with respect to the scaling of the utility function. Con-
sequently, they cannot treat a high-stakes and a low-stakes decision problem
differently if outcomes in the former are simply a “magniﬁcation” of those in
the latter, for instance, if the nuclear accident was 100,000 times worse than
being ﬁned and the beneﬁts of nuclear energy 100,000 times better than
those of traveling for free. But it does not seem at all unreasonable to act
more cautiously in high-stakes situations than in low-stakes ones.65. Moreover, IPCC conﬁdence applies to probability claims, not to (fully speciﬁed) prob-
ability measures; it is not always straightforward to translate conﬁdence in one to conﬁ-
dence in the other.
6. Some of the models mentioned in the previous section are also not invariant to scal-
ing, though Hill (2013) argues that they do not properly capture the stakes dependence
described below. In any case, their reliance on inputs that cannot be expressed in the
IPCC’s conﬁdence language is a reason to set aside these models for our purposes.
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All uTo accommodate this intuition, Hill allows for the set of probability mea-
sures on which the decision is based to be shaped by howmuch is at stake in
the decision. This stakes sensitivity is mediated by conﬁdence: each decision
situation will determine an appropriate conﬁdence level for decision making
based on what is at stake in that decision. When the stakes are low, the de-
cision maker may not need to have a great deal of conﬁdence in a probability
assessment in order to base her decision on it. When the stakes are high,
however, the decision maker will need a correspondingly high degree of
conﬁdence.
To formulate such a conﬁdence-based decision rule, Hill’s model draws
on a purely ordinal notion of conﬁdence, requiring only that the set of prob-
ability measures forms a nested family of sets centered on the measures that
represent the decision maker’s best-estimate probabilities. This structure is
illustrated in ﬁgure 1, where each circle is a set of probability measures.
The innermost set is assigned the lowest conﬁdence level and each superset
a higher conﬁdence level than the one it encloses. These conﬁdence assign-
ments can be thought of as expressing the decision maker’s conﬁdence that
the “true” probability measure is contained in that set. Probability statements
that hold for every measure in a superset enjoy greater conﬁdence because
the decision maker is more conﬁdent that the “true” measure endorses the
statement.
For any given decision, the stakes determine the requisite level of conﬁ-
dence, which in turn determines the set of probability measures taken as the
basis for choice: intuitively, the smallest set that enjoys the required level ofFigure 1. How much is at stake in a decision determines the set of probability mea-
sures that the decision rule can “see.”T
se subject toTABLE 1. SMALL CHANCE OF A BAD OUTCOME
Probability < .01 Probability ≥ .99
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CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS 511conﬁdence.7 Once the set of measures has been picked out in this way, the
decision maker can make use of one of the rules for decision making under
ambiguity discussed earlier, such as MMEU or a-MEU. In the special case
in which the set picked out contains just onemeasure, ordinary expected util-
ity maximization is applicable.
As should be evident, what Hill provides is a schema for conﬁdence-
based decisions rather than a speciﬁc model. Different notions of stakes will
determine different conﬁdence levels. And there is the question of which de-
cision rule to apply in the ﬁnal step. But these details are less important than
the fact that the schema can incorporate roughly the kind of information that
the IPCC provides. Spelling this out is our next task.
4. Conﬁdence and IPCC Judgments
4.1. A Model of Conﬁdence. Now we develop more formally the no-
tion of conﬁdence required to link IPCC communications to the model of
decision making just introduced. As is standard, actions or policies will be
modeled as functions from states of the world to outcomes, where outcomes
are understood to pick out features of the world that the decisionmaker seeks
to promote or inhibit. States are features of the world that, jointly with the
actions, determine what outcome will eventuate. What counts as an outcome
or a state depends on the context: when a decision concerns how to prepare
for drought, for instance, mean temperatures may serve as states, while in the
context of climate change mitigation, they may serve as outcomes.
Central to our model is a distinction between two types of propositions
that are the objects of different kinds of uncertainty: propositions concerning
“ordinary” events, such as global mean surface temperature exceeding 217C
in 2050, and probability propositions such as there being a 50% chance that
temperature will exceed 217C in 2050. Intuitively, the probability proposi-
tions represent possible judgments yielded by scientiﬁcmodels or by experts
and, hence, are propositions in which the decision maker can have more or
less conﬁdence.
Let S 5 fs1, s2,… , sng be a set of n states of the world and Q 5
fA, B,C,…g be a Boolean algebra of sets of such states, called events or
factual propositions. LetP 5 fpig be the set of all possible probability func-
tions on Q and D(P) be the set of all subsets of P.8 Members of D(P) play
a dual role: both as the possible imprecise belief states of the agent and as prob-
ability propositions, that is, propositions about the probability of truth of the7. Formally, Hill (2013) requires both a measure of the stakes associated with a decision
problem and a cautiousness coefﬁcient, which maps stakes onto conﬁdence thresholds.
8. We abstract from technicalities concerning the structure of the state space here and
conduct the discussion as if everything were ﬁnite.
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All ufactual propositions in Q. For instance, if X is the proposition that it will rain
tomorrow, then the proposition that the probability of X is between one-half
and three-quarters is given by the set of probability distributions p such that
:5 ≥ p(X ) ≥ :75. So the probabilistic statements that are qualiﬁed by conﬁ-
dence assessments in the IPCC examples given in section 2 correspond to
elements of D(P).
To represent the conﬁdence assessments appearing in IPCC reports, we
introduce a weak preorder, ⊵, on D(P), that is, a reﬂexive and transitive bi-
nary relation on sets of probability measures. Intuitively, ⊵ captures the rel-
ative conﬁdence that a group of IPCC authors has in the various probability
propositions about the state of the world, with P1 ⊵ P2 meaning that they are
at least as conﬁdent in the probability proposition expressed by P1 as that ex-
pressed by P2, as would be the case if they gave P2 a medium conﬁdence as-
sessment and P1 high conﬁdence. In practice, a conﬁdence relation in line
with IPCC ﬁndings will have up to ﬁve levels, corresponding to the ﬁve
qualiﬁers in their conﬁdence language (sec. 2). It is reasonable to assume
that ⊵ is nontrivial (thatP ⊵∅) and monotonic with respect to logical impli-
cation between probability propositions (i.e., thatP1 ⊵ P2 whenever P1 ⊆ P2),
because one should have more conﬁdence in less precise propositions.
We do not, however, assume that ⊵ is complete. Completeness can fail to
hold for two different reasons. First, there may be issues represented in the
state space about which the agent makes no conﬁdence judgments. For ex-
ample, the IPCC does not assess the chance of rain in London next week.
Second, the agent may make a conﬁdence judgment about a certain proba-
bility proposition but no judgments about other probability propositions
concerning the same issue. For example, the IPCC may report medium con-
ﬁdence that a certain occurrence is likely (66%–100% chance) but say noth-
ing about how conﬁdent one should be that the same occurrence is more
likely than not (50%–100% chance).
Given cardinal conﬁdence assessments of probability propositions, it is
always possible to extract an underlying order ⊵ summarizing the ordinal in-
formation. Hence this setup can also apply when cardinal information is
available. But an order ⊵ does not determine any cardinal conﬁdence assess-
ments. There will be a large family of such assessments, each consistent with
⊵, which will not agree on any question concerning the numbers. The order
thus drastically underspeciﬁes the cardinal conﬁdence measures required to
apply the models discussed in section 3.2. By contrast, the ordinal informa-
tion is precisely of the sort needed by Hill’s account.
Hill’s model of conﬁdence effectively consists of a chain of probability
propositions, {L0, L1, . . . , Ln} with Li ⊂ Li11. The probability proposition
L0 is the most precise probability proposition that the agent accepts; it sum-
marizes her beliefs in the sense that every probability proposition that she
accepts (with sufﬁcient conﬁdence) is implied by every probability functionThis content downloaded from 158.143.233.108 on July 06, 2017 03:44:14 AM
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CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS 513in L0. The other Li are progressively less precise probability propositions
held with progressively greater conﬁdence. The chain {L0, L1, . . . , Ln} is
equivalent to what we shall call a conﬁdence partition: an ordered partition
of the space P of probability measures. Any nested family of probabilities
{L0, . . . , Ln} induces a conﬁdence partition {M0, . . . , Mn}, where L0 5
M0 andMi 5 Li 2 Li21. The element Mi (for i > 0) contains those probabil-
ity measures that the agent rules out as contenders for the “true”measures at
the conﬁdence level i2 1 but not at the higher conﬁdence level i. Inversely, any
conﬁdence partition p 5 fM0,… ,Mng induces a nested family of sets of
probability measures{L0, . . . , Ln} such that L0 5 M0 and Li 5 M0 [ ⋯ [  Mi.
A sample conﬁdence partition and corresponding nested family are given in
ﬁgure 2 for the issue of the weather tomorrow. The agent’s best-estimate prob-
ability range for rain,M0, is the proposition that the probability of rain tomor-
row is between .4 and .6,M1 that it is either between .3 and .4 or between .6
and .7,M2 that it is between .1 and .3 or .7 and .9, andM3 the remaining prob-
abilities. As is generally the case with the Hill model, the agent is represented
by this ﬁgure as having made conﬁdence judgments regarding any pair of these
probability propositions for rain.
Which chain of probability propositions (or, equivalently, which conﬁ-
dence partition) does an IPCC-style assessment recommend for decision
purposes? The probability measures in the lowest element of the partition
are those that satisfy all of the probability propositions, on a given issue, that
are afﬁrmed by the IPCC (with any conﬁdence level). The additional mea-
sures to be considered as contenders at the next level up,M1, need to satisfy
only those probability propositions afﬁrmed by the IPCCwith this next level
up (or higher) level of conﬁdence. Additional probability measures collected
in M2 should satisfy the IPCC probability propositions that are on or above
the next conﬁdence level up, and so on. Only conﬁdence partitions satisfying
these conditions faithfully capture the IPCC conﬁdence and probability as-
sessments.Figure 2. Conﬁdence partition for the proposition that it will rain tomorrow. Brack-
eted intervals show probabilities given by the probability propositions. Nested sets
L0, L1, and L3 can be constructed from the partitionM0, . . .,M3. The overall ordering
is L2 ⊵ L1 ⊵ L0 ; M0 ⊵M1 ⊵M2 ⊵M3.This content downloaded from 158.143.233.108 on July 06, 2017 03:44:14 AM
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All uNote that this protocol picks a unique conﬁdence partition only in the case
in which the conﬁdence relation ⊵ is complete. Otherwise, several conﬁ-
dence partitions will be consistent with the conﬁdence relation; as noted
above, this will generally be the case for IPCC assessments. Since each con-
ﬁdence partition corresponds to a unique complete conﬁdence relation, the
use of a particular partition essentially amounts to “ﬁlling in” conﬁdence as-
sessments that were not provided. How best to “ﬁll in” is an important ques-
tion that is beyond the scope of this investigation.9 (In the ﬁnal section be-
low, we approach the issue from another perspective: how IPCC authors
might reduce the need to perform this completion by providing more conﬁ-
dence assessments.)
Next we illustrate the conﬁdence partition concept by applying it to a
concrete example from the IPCC’s ﬁfth assessment report (AR5).
4.2. An Example. Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) is often used
as a single-number proxy for the overall behavior of the climate system in
response to increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.
The greater the value, the greater the tendency to warm in response to green-
house gases. The quantity is deﬁned by a hypothetical global experiment:
start with the preindustrial atmosphere and instantaneously double the con-
centration of carbon dioxide; now sit back and allow the system to reach its
new equilibrium (this would take hundreds to thousands of years). ECS is
the difference between the annual global mean surface temperature of the
preindustrial world and that of the new equilibrium world. In short, it an-
swers the question: How much does the world warm if we double CO2?
The most recent IPCC ﬁndings on ECS draw on several chapters of the
Working Group I contribution to the AR5. Estimates of ECS are based on
statistical analyses of the warming observed so far, similar analyses using
simple to intermediate complexity climate models, reconstructions of cli-
mate change in the distant past (paleoclimate), as well as the behavior of
the most complex, supercomputer-driven climate models used in the last
two phases of the colossal Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP3
and CMIP5). An expert author team reviewed all of this research, weighing
its strengths, weaknesses, and uncertainties, and came to the following col-
lective judgments. With high conﬁdence, ECS is likely in the range 1.57C–
4.57C and extremely unlikely less than 17C. With medium conﬁdence, it is
very unlikely greater than 67C (Stocker et al. 2013, 81).9. While we do not necessarily recommend doing so, we note that from a purely formal
perspective, it is easy to deﬁne a unique “canonical” conﬁdence partition for any incom-
plete relation: it sufﬁces to take eachMi to be the largest set satisfying the conditions laid
out above. This is analogous to the so-called “natural extension” in the imprecise prob-
ability literature (Walley 1991). Similarly, but perhaps more practically, one could use
the largest set of probability measures from a certain family of distributions.
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CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS 515In light of the conﬁdence model discussed above, reports of this kind can
be understood in terms of a conﬁdence partition over probability density
functions (pdfs). Beginning from all possible pdfs on the real line—each
one expressing a (precise) probability claim about ECS—think of what
the author team is doing, as they evaluate and debate the evidence, as sort-
ing those pdfs into a partition p 5 fM0,… ,Mng. The ﬁndings cited above
then communicate aspects of this conﬁdence partition. To illustrate, we pre-
sent a toy partition that exempliﬁes the IPCC’s ﬁndings on ECS.
Suppose the conﬁdence partition has four elements p 5 fM0,… ,M3g.
For concreteness, we suppose that each element contains only lognormal
distributions.10 Figure 3 displays the pdfs in the ﬁrst two elements of the par-
tition. The solid lines are the functions from M0; collectively, these indicate
what the IPCC’s experts regard as a plausible range of probabilities for ECS
in light of the available evidence. The dashed lines are the pdfs inM1, which
collectively represent a second tier of plausibility. The elementM2 is another
step down from there, andM3 is the bottom of the barrel: all of the pdfs more
or less ruled out by the body of research that the experts evaluated (M2 and
M3 are not represented in ﬁg. 3).
Recall that the partitionp generates a nested family of subsets {L1, . . . , Ln},
where Li is the union of P0 through Pi and each L is associated with a level
of conﬁdence. Here we are concerned mainly with L0 5 M0 and L1 5
M0 [ M1, and we suppose in this case that L0 corresponds to medium con-
ﬁdence and L1 to high conﬁdence. To see how an IPCC-style ﬁnding follows
from the conﬁdence partition, consider what our partition says about ECS
values above 67. If we restrict attention to L0, there are only two pdfs to ex-
amine; one assigns (nearly) zero probability to values above 67 while the
other assigns just under .1 probability (the hatched area in ﬁg. 3). In the
IPCC’s calibrated language, the probability range 0–.1 is called very un-
likely; thus the ﬁnding that ECS is very unlikely greater than 67C (medium
conﬁdence).
The IPCC’s two other ﬁndings on ECS are reﬂected in our partition as
follows. Reporting with high conﬁdence means broadening our view from
L0 to L1, taking the M1 pdfs into account in addition to those in M0. The in-
terval 1.5–4.5 is indicated in ﬁgure 3 in gray. The smallest probability given
to that interval by any of the functions pictured is a littlemore than .6, and the
highest probability is nearly one, an interval that corresponds roughly with
the meaning of likely (.66–1). Regarding ECS values below one, several
pdfs give that region zero probability, while the most left leaning of them
gives it .05. The range 0–.05 is called extremely unlikely. Thus we have that10. “Most studies aiming to constrain climate sensitivity with observations do indeed
indicate a similar to lognormal probability distribution of climate sensitivity” (Meehl
et al. 2007, sec. 10.5.2.1).
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All uECS is likely in the range 1.57C–4.57C and extremely unlikely less than 17C
(both with high conﬁdence).
The three ﬁndings discussed above are far from the only ones that follow
from the example partition. To report again on ECS values above 67C, only
now with high conﬁdence rather than medium, the probability interval
should be expanded from 0–.1 to 0–.2 (.2 being the area to the right of 67
under the fattest-tailed of theM1 pdfs). Or to report on values below 17Cwith
medium conﬁdence rather than high, the probability interval should be
shrunk from 0–.5 to 0–.01 (exceptionally unlikely). The conﬁdence partition
determines an imprecise probability at medium conﬁdence, and another at
high conﬁdence, for any interval of values for ECS.
It should be emphasized that these additional ﬁndings do not necessar-
ily follow from the three that the IPCC in fact published. They follow from
this particular conﬁdence partition, which is constrained—though not fully
determined—by the IPCC’s published ﬁndings.11 Asking what could be re-
ported about ECS at very high conﬁdence further highlights the limits of
what the IPCC has conveyed. Suppose the set L2 corresponds to very high
conﬁdence. As the IPCC has said nothing with very high conﬁdence, we
have no information about the pdfs that should go into M2, and thus L2,
so we have no indication of how much the reported probability ranges
should be expanded in order to claim very high conﬁdence. The reason
may be that in the conﬁdence partition representation of the experts’ groupFigure 3. Illustration of a conﬁdence partition consistent with IPCC ﬁndings on
equilibrium climate sensitivity. The hatched area corresponds to the ﬁnding that
ECS is very unlikely greater than 67C (medium conﬁdence).11. Regarding our extrapolated high-conﬁdence ﬁnding on ECS exceeding 67C, proba-
bility .2 does appear to be the upper limit under the restriction to lognormal distributions,
though not in the absence of this restriction. This may be relevant to the issue of partition
completion discussed in the previous section.
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CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS 517beliefs, M2 is a sprawling menagerie of pdfs. In this case, probabilities at
the very high conﬁdence level would be so imprecise as to appear uninfor-
mative. On the other hand, it may sometimes be of interest to policy mak-
ers just how much (or how little) can be said at the very high conﬁdence
level.
5. Discussion. We now treat some possible objections, identify open ques-
tions and challenges, and point out some potential consequences of this
decision-theoretic take on IPCC assessments.
Our model should be understood as illustrating how, in principle, such
ﬁndings can be used in decision making. It provides a disciplining structure
for the uncertainty expressed in IPCC ﬁndings—structure that is a prerequi-
site for the use of such ﬁndings within a normative decision model. (As
noted above, there remains a gap between IPCC ﬁndings and the decision
model insofar as the model involves a full conﬁdence partition whereas
the statements provided by the IPCC constrain but do not fully determine
one.) Our model sketches one way in which such ﬁndings can be harnessed
to provide concrete decision support, but other procedures for generating
conﬁdence partitions, or even for using the partial information without in-
troducing new structure, deserve exploration. We have concentrated on the
only decision model we could ﬁnd that uses an ordinal conﬁdence structure
over probability statements, but it may be possible to develop alternativemod-
els with these features.
An interesting question concerns the implications of the model for judg-
ments of joint probability and conﬁdence. Suppose that two IPCC author
groups respectively report with high conﬁdence that low rainfall is likely
and that low temperature is likely. What can be inferred about the prospect
of both low rainfall and low temperature? This question turns on at least
three issues. The ﬁrst is the standard issue of joint probabilities. As is well
known, one cannot conclude from these probability assessments that low
rainfall and temperature is likely. And indeed, under the model set out in sec-
tion 4, nothing more than what follows from the individual probability prop-
ositions is assumed about the joint probability.
The second is the issue of “joint conﬁdence.” The nested sets representa-
tion of conﬁdence employed in Hill’smodel implies that if both “low rainfall
is likely” and “low temperature is likely” are held with high conﬁdence, then
their conjunction “low rainfall is likely and low temperature is likely” must
be held with high conﬁdence as well. This follows from the fact that a prop-
osition is held with high conﬁdence if it is supported by every probability
function contained in the high-conﬁdence set. On the other hand, it does
not follow that the proposition “a combination of low rainfall and low tem-
perature is likely” is held with high conﬁdence since the high probability of
this combination does not follow from high probability of its elements.This content downloaded from 158.143.233.108 on July 06, 2017 03:44:14 AM
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All uThe third issue involves the calibration of conﬁdence levels between
groups. How do we know that what one group means by “high conﬁdence”
is the same as the other (and, indeed, that they mean the same thing to the
policy maker using their ﬁndings)? A proper calibration scale would enable
clear and unambiguous formulation and communication of conﬁdence judg-
ments across authors and actors. Were one to take our proposal for connect-
ing the IPCC uncertainty language with theories of decision seriously, one
major challenge is to develop such a scale. This development would likely
go hand in hand with elicitation mechanisms that would allow IPCC authors
to reveal and express their conﬁdence in probability assessments.
Turning now to the use of the conﬁdence partition in decision making, the
Hill (2013) family of models gives conﬁdence a role in pointing decision
makers to the set of probability measures that is right for them in a given con-
text. The decision maker’s utilities determine the stakes, and their cautious-
ness coefﬁcient maps the stakes to a level of conﬁdence and thus to the set of
probability measures that their decision rule will take into account in evalu-
ating actions. IPCC ﬁndings inform the conﬁdence element of Hill’s model,
but they deliver neither a measure of the stakes associated with a decision
problem nor a cautiousness coefﬁcient. Where an individual acts alone,
the stakes are determined by her preferences (or her utility function) while
the cautiousness coefﬁcient reﬂects some feature of her attitudes to uncer-
tainty. In the case of climate policy decisions, things are analogous but more
complicated. Putting utilities on outcomes and ﬁxing the level of cautious-
ness are difﬁcult tasks, insofar as both should reﬂect the interests and atti-
tudes of individuals living in different places and at different times. That
IPCC ﬁndings (at least those addressing the physical science basis of climate
change) do not provide these elements is as it should be: this is not a “fact”
dimension, on which climate scientists have expertise, but a “value” dimen-
sion, which derives from the stakeholders to the decision.
This fact-value distinction (or belief taste distinction in economics) is
muddied by many of the decision models surveyed above, for instance,
the MMEU model (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), as well as those of
Maccheroni et al. (2006) and Chateauneuf and Faro (2009), none of which
permit a clean separation of beliefs from tastes.12 In the case of MMEU, for
example, the set of probability functions captures both the beliefs or infor-
mation at the decision maker’s disposal and his taste for choosing in the face
of uncertainty. Using a smaller range of probabilities can be interpreted as12. See Klibanoff et al. (2005, secs. 1, 3, 5.1) for a clear discussion or, alternatively, Gil-
boa and Marinacci (2013, secs. 3.5, 4) and Hill (2016, sec. 3). This issue largely turns on
so-called comparative statics results, reported in Gilboa and Marinacci (2013, sec. 4) for
the MMEU model and in the respective papers (proposition 8 in each case) for the
others.
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CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS 519having a less cautious attitude toward one’s ignorance. Such models are less
suitable in a policy decision context in which scientists’ input should in
principle be restricted to the domain of facts (and uncertainty about them).
In this context, it is another virtue of the Hill model that it does support a
clean fact-value distinction (Hill 2013, sec. 3). Conﬁdence is exclusively a
belief aspect, whereas the cautiousness coefﬁcient is a taste factor. So the
encroachment of value judgments into scientiﬁc reporting is at least not a
direct theoretical consequence of the model.
This normatively attractive property of the model appears to be quite rare.
Moreover, of the other models we have found in the literature that both sup-
port a neat belief-taste distinction and incorporate second-order conﬁdence,
all require that conﬁdence be cardinal. (We noted this for the most promi-
nent such model, the smooth ambiguity model, in sec. 3.2.) So, at least as
far as we are aware, Hill’s model is the only available decision theoretically
solid representation that can capture the role of uncertainty about probability
judgments without demanding value judgments from scientists or cardinal
second-order conﬁdence assessments. As such, our investigation provides
a perhaps unexpected vindication of IPCC practice via the afﬁnity between
IPCC uncertainty guidance and one of the only decision models that seems
suitable for the climate policy decisions they aim to inform.
6. Recommendations. Our discussion of the IPCC’s uncertainty frame-
work and the relevant policy decision requirements allows us to make sev-
eral tentative recommendations.
In the climate sensitivity example above, we saw multiple statements
each addressing a different range (left tail, middle, right tail) of the same un-
certain quantity. And these statements used different conﬁdence levels. But
what we do not see in this example, nor have we found elsewhere, is multiple
statements at different conﬁdence levels, concerning the same range of the
uncertain quantity. That is, we do not see pairs of claims such as the chance
that ECS exceeds 67 is, with medium conﬁdence, less than 10% and with
high conﬁdence less than 20%. The conﬁdence partition formalism shows
how it canmake sense, conceptually, to answer the same question at multiple
conﬁdence levels. Doing so gives a richer picture of scientiﬁc knowledge,
and the added information may be valuable to policy makers and to the pub-
lic. There is no basis for the current (unwritten) convention of reporting only
a single conﬁdence level; a richer reporting practice is possible and appears
desirable.
Given the possibility of reporting at more than one conﬁdence level for a
given ﬁnding, in choosing just one, IPCC authors are implicitly managing a
trade-off between the size of a probability interval and the level of conﬁ-
dence (e.g., likely [.66–1] with medium conﬁdence vs. more likely than
not [.5–1] with high conﬁdence). Yet the uncertainty guidance notes offerThis content downloaded from 158.143.233.108 on July 06, 2017 03:44:14 AM
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All uno advice to authors on managing this trade-off.13 Moreover, in light of the
decisionmodel developed above, there is an aspect to this choice that falls on
the value side of the fact-value divide. While in practice IPCC authors may
select on epistemic grounds (where they can make the most informative
statements), the choice may be understood as involving a value judgment,
since it may appear to suggest which set of probability measures the readers
should use in their decision making. Normally it is the agent’s utilities and
cautiousness that together pick out the appropriate set from the nested family
of probability measures. So not only is reporting at multiple conﬁdence lev-
els conceptually sensible, but it may be desirable in order simultaneously to
give relevant information to different users who will determine for them-
selves the level of conﬁdence at which they require probabilistic information
to inform their decisions.
Naturally, it is impractical to demand that IPCC reports provide assess-
ments at every conﬁdence level on every issue that they treat probabilisti-
cally. But a feasible step in that direction might be to encourage reporting at
more than one level, where the evidence allows, and when the results would
be informative. The value-judgment aspect of conﬁdence suggests a second
step. The choice of conﬁdence level(s) at which IPCC authors assess prob-
ability would ideally be informed in some way by the public or its represen-
tatives, suggesting that policy makers should be involved at the beginning
of the IPCC process, to provide input regarding the conﬁdence level(s) at
which scientiﬁc assessments would be most decision relevant. Communica-
tion of the relevant conﬁdence level between policy makers and climate sci-
entists would rely on and be formulated in terms of the sort of calibration
scale touched on above. There are, of course, many decisions to be made,
with different stakes and stakeholders: mitigation decisions and adaptation
decisions, public and private, global, regional, and local. The envisioned pol-
icy maker and stakeholder input would presumably indicate varying levels
of conﬁdence for key ﬁndings across IPCC chapters and working groups.
The realm of recommendations and possibilities goes well beyond those
explored here. Our aim is simply to suggest some ideas for guiding practice
on the basis of how IPCC assessments can be used in decision and policy
making and, more importantly, to open a discussion on the issue.REFERENCES
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